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So long as Medicare manages to pay its bills, the program may
seem to be working. But just under the surface, Medicare is bad-
ly in disarray. The program faces dramatic long-term financing
problems that threaten to create untenable payroll tax burdens for
workers or draconian benefit reductions for retirees. The program's
benefit structure includes broad gaps that leave the elderly unpro-
tected from high medical expenses and resulting financial ruin. Yet
payroll taxes are already too high, reducing employment and eco-
nomic growth. To counter the program's rapidly rising costs, new
regulatory burdens have been imposed on Medicare-financed serv-
ices. But these burdens are producing a decline in the quality of
.care for the elderly, and threaten to deprive doctors of professional
freedoms and authority central to the American medical system.
Consequently fundamental reform of Medicare seems long overdue.
Congress adopted Medicare in 1965 as part of the Great Society
reforms, and the program became effective onJuly 1, 1966.1 As en-
acted, Medicare provided coverage for hospital and medical care
primarily for persons aged 65 and over who received Social Security
retirement benefits.2 In 1973, Congress expanded the program to
provide full Medicare benefits to those under 65 receiving disability
benefits for at least two years.3 In 1982, federal employees were
required to participate in the program, and in 1983 employees of
nonprofit organizations were required to participate as well. 4 In
1983, to counter rapidly rising Medicare costs, Congress adopted
the Prospective Payment System (PPS) to pay doctors and hospitals
under the program, 5 as discussed below. Otherwise, the structure
and coverage of the program has remained fundamentally the same
since its adoption.
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In fiscal year (FY) 1967, total Medicare net expenditures over and
above the premiums paid by the elderly amounted to $2.7 billion.13
By FY 1970, the program's net expenditures had soared to $6.2 bil-
lion, already far exceeding original cost estimates. 7 The program's
expenditures have continued to grow rapidly, at least doubling
every five years.8 In FY 1988, net Medicare expenditures are pro-
jected to total about $80 billion, approximately 8% of the entire
federal budget. -
Today, Medicare covers about 28 million people over age 65 and
about three million disabled beneficiaries under 65.10 About 94%
of the elderly are now covered by the program." t Medicare has be-
come much too large a factor in our economic and social life to re-
main in such disorder.
This Article will argue that the deep problems of Medicare all
could be addressed fruitfully by expanding the role of the private
sector in providing health care coverage. Workers and their em-
ployers could be allowed to contribute to individual investment ac-
counts, "health IRAs," during working years. In retirement, such
accounts would then serve as a reserve of savings and health insur-
ance to cover more routine medical expenses in place of Medicare.
Those exercising this private option would still receive coverage
through Medicare for catastrophic expenses. The public sector
would continue to provide full Medicare coverage for those who
may not choose the private option. Government would also provide
health coverage to those in need who, because of inconsistent work
histories or other reasons, were unable to develop adequate retire-
ment health coverage through the joint private/public systems. In
6. 1987 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance
Trust Fund. 'Fable 5 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 HI Trustees' Rep.]. 1987 Annual Report
of the Board of Frustecs of the Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund.
Table 5 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 SMI Trustees' Rep.].
7. 1987 HI Trustees' Rep., supra note 6, at Table 5; 1987 SMI Trustees' Rep., supra
note 6, at Table 5.
8. 1987 HI Trustees' Rep., supra note 6, at Table 5; 1987 SMI Trustees' Rep., supra
note 6, at Fable 5.
9. 1987 HI Trustees' Rep., supra note 6, at Table 5; 1987 SMI Trustees' Rep., supra
note 6, at Table 5. The federal budget for fiscal year (FY) 1988 is currently projected to
be $1,024.3 billion. Off. of Mgmt. and Budget, Exec. Off. of the President, Budget of
the United States Government, 1988, M-4.
10. 1987 HI Trustees' Rep., supra note 6, at 2.
11. In 1984, about 26.6 million elderly people in the U.S. were covered by Medicare.
Annual Statistical Supp., supra note I, at Table 148. In that year, the elderly population
in the U.S. was about 28.3 million, as calculated from 1987 Annual Report of the Board
of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disablity Insurance
Trust Funds, Table Al (1987) [hereinafter 1987 OASDI Trustees' Rep.].
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fact, bipartisan legislation has been introduced in Congress to pro-
vide for just such reform. 12
The analysis will begin with a brief review of the current Medicare
system and an examination of the program's serious problems.
Next, the Article will review and analyze pending federal legislation
designed to provide catastrophic coverage under the program and
add new taxes. Finally, the private sector option, which proposes to
cover routine medical expenses with private health care accounts,
will be analyzed.
L The Current Mledicare System
Medicare consists of two components-Part A, or hospital insur-
ance (HI), and Part B, or supplemental medical insurance (SMI)."'
Part A pays for the first 60 days of hospital care for each spell of
illness, subject to a deductible that currently requires the patient to
pay the first $540 in hospital expenses. 14 An illness is considered
"over" when the patient has spent 60 consecutive days out of the
hospital. Consequently, if the patient reenters the hospital after be-
ing out for 60 days, Part A will pay for another 60 days of care,
subject to another deductible of $540.
Part A will continue to pay for up to 90 days of hospital care for
each spell of illness, but after the first 60 days the patient must pay
part of the cost each day in a "co-insurance fee." Currently this co-
insurance fee for the 61st to 90th day of hospital care is $135 per
day.' 5 For hospital stays beyond 90 days, Part A pays for 60 addi-
tional "lifetime reserve days" once during the life of each benefici-
ary. The patient must pay a co-insurance fee, currently $270, for
each of these lifetime reserve days.' 6 Overall, therefore, Medicare
provides coverage for up to 150 days of hospital care for each spell
of illness, or up to 90 days after lifetime reserve days are used.
Only about 0.5% of all Medicare beneficiaries each year stay in
the hospital for between 61 and 90 days. Only about 0.2% experi-
ence a hospital stay of more than 90 days and thus use some lifetime
reserve days. Running out of lifetime reserve days and exceeding
the Medicare coverage limit altogether is extremely rare. Only
12. H.R. 955, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).
13. For sources describing the current Medicare system, see Annual Statistical
Supp., supra note r, at 36-40; Health Care Financing Admin., U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Services, Your Medicare Handbook (1987).
14. 52 Fed. Reg. 35056 (1987).
15. Id.
16. Id.
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about 2,000 Medicare beneficiaries, about 0.007% of the Medicare
population, do so each year. 17
Part A also pays for up to 100 days of care in a skilled nursing
facility after discharge from a hospital. After the first 20 days of
such care, the patient must pay a co-insurance fee each day currently
equal to $67.50 daily.' 8 Part A covers unlimited home health care
visits, prescribed by a doctor, to provide skilled nursing care, physi-
cal therapy, or speech therapy to those who are confined to their
homes. Part A also provides up to 210 days of hospice care for the
terminally ill. All Part A deductibles and co-insurance fees are cur-
rently indexed to increase each year with rising hospital costs.
Part A coverage is financed through an earmarked portion of the
Social Security payroll tax; the HI payroll tax rate is 2.9% split be-
tween employee and employer.' 9 This tax is assessed on the em-
ployee's wage income up to an annual maximum of $45,000 in
1988. The wage cap is indexed to increase each year with average
earnings. 20 With certain narrow, well-defined exceptions, general
revenues may not be used to finance Part A benefits, and the pro-
gram must rely primarily on payroll tax revenues for funds.
Medicare Part B pays for services by physicians, surgeons, ther-
apists, chiropractors, anesthesiologists, pathologists, radiologists,
and psychiatrists; it also covers diagnostic tests, certain medical
supplies and equipment, and services related to home health care
visits. The beneficiary pays for the first $75 in expenses each year
under the deductible for Part.B, which is fixed by statute. Part B
pays for 80% of remaining charges, unless such charges exceed the
maximum approved fees for the services under a schedule main-
tained by Medicare, in which case Part B will pay only 80% of the
maximum approved fees. The beneficiary pays 20% of approved
charges as a co-insurance fee and 100% of charges above the Medi-
care maximums. About 30-50% of Medicare claims each year in-
clude doctors' charges above the Medicare set fees. 2 1
Part B is financed in part by a current monthly premium of
$24.80,22 about $300 per year, paid by each elderly beneficiary.
17. Robbins & Hurwitz, Catastrophic Health Insurance is Bad Medicine, Econ. Pol'y
Bull. No. 26, 3 (1987) [hereinafter Robbins & Hurwitz].
18. 52 Fed. Reg. 35056 (1987).
19. 1987 HI Trustees' Rep., supra note 6, at 2-3.
20. 52 Fed. Reg. 41672-73 (1987).
21. McMenamin, Mandatory and Other Medicare Assignment Issues and Options,
Health Industry Mfrs. Ass'n 6, (Aug. 9. 1987).
22. 52 Fed. Reg. 36716-17 (1987).
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These premiums cover about 25% of program costs. 2 3 General rev-
enues finance remaining expenditures. The Part B premium has re-
cently been indexed under law to increase sufficiently each year to
finance 25% of projected program costs. But this is not a perma-
nent provision, and Congress may instead index the premium to in-
crease each year with health costs or general inflation.
Neither Part A nor Part B covers long-term care in nursing homes
or other institutions. The costs of such care generally are financed
from the personal resources of the elderly or their families, or
through Medicaid. 24 Medicare also does not cover outpatient pre-
scription drugs, dental care, eyeglasses, hearing aids, and similar
items. Most of the elderly have private medical coverage that sup-
plements Medicare. 25 As generally mandated by state regulatory re-
quirements, 26 this insurance covers the Part A hospital co-insurance
fees and 90% of the costs for 365 days of hospital care beyond the
Medicare limits. As a practical matter, virtually no one ever exceeds
this 365-day limit, and many policies simply provide for unlimited
hospital coverage. The private insurance also is required to cover
the Part B 20% co-insurance fee, after an annual deductible of $200,
up to $5,000 per year. Such insurance, plus Medicare, provides cov-
erage of $25,000 per person for Part B expenses, and such health
care expenses almost never exceed this amount. Accordingly, some
policies cover the Part B co-insurance fees without any annual caps.
About three-fourths of the elderly have such coverage through
private insurance or Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). 27
23. 1987 SMI Trustees' Rep., supra note 6, at Table 5.
24. Medicaid is a means-tested program financed out of general revenues. It pays
for all health care expenses of the elderly who have low incomes and little or no saved
resources. It also provides health benefits for many of the poor below age 65.
25. About 72% of the elderly have private insurance either purchased directly or
paid for by their former employers as part of pension benefits. Robbins & Hurwitz, supra
note 17, at 5.
26. The model standards of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
are in force in virtually every state. See 46 Fed. Reg. 6303-04 (1987). See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ss; 42 C.F.R. §§ 403.200-403.222 (1986); Private Sector Task Force on Cata-
strophic and Long Term Health Care, Catastrophic and Long-Term Health Care: Pri-
vate Sector Alternatives 9 (1986) (on file with author).
27. About 72% of the elderly have private insurance; see supra note 25. And as of
November 1987, another 990,229 elderly persons received much of their medical cover-
age from HMOs. A recent initiative allows retirees to choose to have their Medicare
benefits provided by an HMO. The federal government pays the HMO the average ex-
penditure per beneficiary under Medicare. Federal law also requires the HMO to use
some of its net profits to provide supplemental medical benefits to the participating
elderly, and HMOs now compete to attract elderly customers by offering such supple-
mental benefits. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 114, 96 Stat. 329, 341-53 (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 417 (1986); Health Care Financing Ad-
min., TEFRA Risk HMOs/CMPs (Nov. 1, 1987). About 3% of the elderly, consequently.
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Another 10% of the elderly are covered for such benefits through
Medicaid.28 Those with this coverage are protected against cata-
strophic expenses for acute care, although catastrophic expenses for
long-term nursing home carestill are not covered for those ineligi-
ble for Medicaid. Private insurance is available for nursing home
care, prescription drugs, doctor's charges above the Medicare ap-
proved fees, dental care, and other items, although most of the eld-
erly have not purchased such coverage.
If. The Imperative for Reform
Based on the latest set of annual reports for the Medicare pro-
gram, 29 Medicare Part A is unlikely to be able to pay its promised
benefits by about the end of the next decade. Under the most
widely cited intermediate projections in the reports, Part A will run
short of funds by 2002.30 Under the so-called pessimistic projec-
tions, the program will run short by 1996. 31
Moreover, the program's projected financial gap grows wider
over the long term. Under intermediate projections, the long-term
financing gap for Part A alone is larger than the long-term deficit
reduction package for all of Social Security that was enacted in
emergency 1983 legislation to save that system from bankruptcy. 32
By the time those entering the work force today retire, payroll tax
receive such benefits through HMOs, assuming that about 30.4 million individuals 65
and over currently live in the U.S. Estimated from 1987 OASDI Trustees' Rep., supra
note 11, at Table AI.
28. Annual Statistical Supp., supra note 1, at Table 162, shows 3.1 million Medicaid
recipients 65 and over in 1985, while 1987 OASDI Trustees' Rep., supra note 11, at
Table Al, shows 28.9 million individuals 65 and over in the U.S. in 1985.
29. See generally 1987 HI Trustees' Rep., supra note 6; 1987 SMI Trustees' Rep., supra
note 6.
30. 1987 HI Trustees' Rep., supra note 6. at Table 11.
31. Id. The pessimistic projections generally assume an economic performance simi-
lar to the experience of the 1970s, with periodic recessions and sustained inflation. The
intermediate projections assume more sustained economic growth and lower inflation.
)emographically, the intermediate projections assume an increase in fertility, which
means more workers in the future paving taxes into the system, and a slowdown in the
rate of increase in life expectancy, which means fewer beneficiaries in the future to col-
lect benefits. The pessimistic projections assume a decline in fertility and a sustained
improvement in the rate of increase in life expectancy. These demographic assumptions
make little difference in the short term, but have a dominant influence on the outlook for
the system over the long run.
32. The long-term gap for Part A, or HI, tinder the intermediate assumptions is
2.30% of taxable payroll. 1987 HI Trustees' Rep., supra note 6, at Table It. The 1983
Social Security amendments reduced the long-term gap for that program by 2.09% of
taxable payroll. 1983 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age
and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (1983) [hereinafter 1983
OASDI Trustees' Rep.].
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revenues under these projections would be sufficient to pay only
43% of promised Part A benefits. 33 Paying all such benefits for
workers entering the labor force today would require a 130% in-
crease in the total Medicare payroll tax rate, from a 2.9% rate today
on employers and employees combined to a rate of 6.7% in 2040. 34
By comparison, the combined employer/employee tax rate for all
other components of Social Security was only 11.4% in 1987.
35
Under the pessimistic projections, the long-term financing gap for
Medicare Part A is over twice as large as the long-term deficit reduc-
tion provided for all of Social Security in the 1983 legislation.3 6
Under such projections, current payroll taxes would be sufficient to
pay only 21% of promised Part A benefits for workers entering the
labor force today. 37 Paying all benefits to these workers would re-
quire an increase of almost 400% in the total Medicare payroll tax
rate, from 2.9% to 13.6%.38 The payroll tax rate for Medicare Part
A alone would be higher then than the total tax rate for all of Social
Security today. 39
And these figures do not tell the whole story. The long-term pro-
jections for Medicare Part A imply that equivalent fiscal difficulties
will face Part B. 40 The required increase of 130% to 400% in Medi-
care payroll tax rates discussed above suggests that general revenue
33. Under these projections, in 2040, the total cost of the HI program will be 6.73%
of taxable payroll. 1987 OASDI Trustees' Rep., supra note 11, at Table E3. The total HI
payroll tax rate on employer and employee is 2.9%, as noted, amounting to 43% of the
projected cost rate.
34. Id.
35. The total combined payroll tax rate for employers and employees for the Old-
Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance programs (OASDI) is 11.4% for 1987. This tax
rate will be increased under current law to 12.12% in 1988. 1987 OASDI Trustees'
Rep., supra note 11, at Table 1.
36. The long-term gap for Part A, or HI, under the pessimistic assumptions is 6.65%
of taxable payroll. 1987 HI Trustee's Rep., supra note 6, at Table II. The 1983 Social
Security amendments reduced the long-term gap for that program by about 3.2% of
taxable payroll. Calculated from 1982 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the
Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds 70
(1982) and 1983 OASDI Trustees' Rep., supra note 30, at 80-81.
37. In 2040, the total cost of the HI program will be 13.59% of taxable payroll.
1987 OASDI Trustees' Rep., supra note 1I, at Table E3. The total HI payroll tax rate on
employer and employee is 2.9%, amounting to 21% of the projected cost rate.
38. Id.
39. See note 33.
40. Since Part B is financed mostly by general revenues rather than an earmarked
payroll tax, technically it cannot run short of funds to pay benefits. Congress is expected
to appropriate whatever general revenue contributions are needed to pay benefits. Con-
sequently, the federal government does not publish regular long-term projections of the
financial outlook for Part B. But the discussion above indicates that long-term financial
burdens on the general taxpayer and the elderly may be expected under the current
system.
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contributions to Medicare Part B also will have to increase by 130%
to 400% in order to pay all promised benefits to workers now enter-
ing the labor force. With current general revenue contributions at
$25 billion per year,4 1 this means that paying all benefits to today's
young workers would require a total annual general revenue contri-
bution to Part B of $60 to $125 billion in today's terms. In addition,
annual Part B premiums paid by the elderly would have to increase
by 130% to 400%.
None of the program's revenue sources-payroll taxes, general
revenue contributions, or premiums on the elderly-are promising
candidates for providing increased revenues to meet future program
costs. Indeed, payroll taxes are already far too high. Total Social
Security and Medicare payroll taxes for an individual worker, includ-
ing the employer's share, can be as high as $6,759 in 1988.42 With
the payroll tax rate increases scheduled under current law, the maxi-
mum annual payroll tax is projected to reach $7,574 by 1990.4 3
This figure compares with a maximum total payroll tax of $348 in
1965, $189 in 1958, and $60 in 1949.4 4 The total payroll tax for
average workers has soared from 2.0% of income in 1949 to 4.5%
in 1958, 7.25% in 1965, and 15.02% in 1988. 4 5 For most workers,
the total employer/employee payroll tax is more than each pays in
federal income tax. 46 Indeed, the payroll tax is now approaching
the personal income tax in total amount of revenues generated. By
41. 1987 SMI Trustees' Rep., supra note 6, at Table 5.
42. The total payroll tax rate for 1988 is 15.02%. 1987 OASDI Trustees' Rep., supra
note 11, at Table 1; 1987 HI Trustees' Rep., supra note 6, at Table I. With a maximum
taxable income for the year of $45,000 (see supra note 20), this means the maximum
annual lax for an individual worker, including both the employer and employee shares.
is $6,759.
43. The total payroll tax rate for 1990 will be 15.3%. 1987 OASDI Trustces" Rep..
supra note 11, at 1; 1987 HI Trustees' Rep., supra note 6, at Table I. Under intermediate
assumptions (Alternative IIB projections), the maximum taxable income in 1990 will he
$49,500, making the maximum tax for the year $7,573.50. 1987 OASDI Trustees' Rep.,
supra, at 39.
44. P. Ferrara, Social Security: The Inherent Contradiction, Table 2 (1980).
45. Calculated from 1987 OASDI Trustees' Rep.. supra note 11, at Table 1; 1987 HI
Trustees' Rep., supra note 6, at Table 1.
46. The total payroll tax rate for 1988. including employee and employer shares, is
15.02%; see supra note 40. Under the new tax reform legislation, 80% of workers either
have no income tax liability or are in the 15% tax bracket. S. Rep. No. 99-313, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1986). Moreover, income taxes are reduced by the standard deduc-
tion and personal exemptions, while payroll taxes are not. So for the great maIority of
workers, total payroll taxes, including employer and employee shares, are greater than
individual income tax liability.
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FY 1990, the payroll tax is projected to raise $358 billion, compared
with the $450 billion raised by the personal income tax. 47
Few have noticed the heavy burden that the sharply increased
payroll tax now places on low-income jobs. A married worker with
two children earning below-poverty wages of $10,000 this year will
pay $751 in payroll taxes, with another $751 from his employer, for
a total payroll tax burden of $1,502 on this worker's low-income
job.48 Since the payroll tax is basically a tax on the act of employ-
ment, this huge tax burden limits employment opportunities for the
unskilled. 49 The tax discourages employers from hiring and dis-
courages workers on the margin from working as much as other-
wise, since the return from such work is reduced. The overall result
is fewer jobs and reduced economic growth. Here, as in other sec-
tors of the economy, the result of taxing something is that there is
less of it. A study by the Congressional Budget Office estimated
that the payroll tax rate increases from 1979 to 1982 produced a
loss of 500,000 jobs per year by 1982.50 In another study, Robbins
estimated that the payroll tax rate increases from 1985 to 1990
would eliminate as many as 900,000 U.S. jobs and ultimately reduce
gross national product by as much as $25 billion per year. 5' In a
47. Off. of Mgmt. and Budget, Exec. Off. of the President, Historical Tables, Budget
of the United States Government, 1988, Tables 2.1 and 2.4 (1987).
48. With a total payroll tax rate for 1988 equal to 15.02% split between employee
and employer, the payroll tax liability on $10,000 in income would be $751 each for the
employee and the employer. See supra note 40.
49. In theory, the payroll tax could be changed to make it progressive, reducing the
tax burden on lower-income workers and increasing it on higher-income workers, and
focusing any future increases on higher-income workers as well. But this would funda-
mentally change the nature of the Social Security and Medicare systems, which are sup-
posed to be contributing systems in which workers and their employers generally
finance their own benefits. Consequently, such a change has not been considered a pol-
icy option in the past.
Moreover, avoiding a major increase on average-income workers through such pro-
gressive restructuring would require a dramatic tax increase on the relatively small
number of higher-income workers, quite possibly requiring intractable payroll tax rates
of 50% or more on such workers, considering needed future tax increases. This pro-
gressive restructuring and the associated higher marginal tax rates on average- and/or
higher-income workers would also be contrary to the recent trend of federal tax policy,
which has been to reduce and flatten marginal tax rates.
50. Cong. Budget Off. (CBO), Aggregate Economic Effects of Changes in Social Se-
curity Taxes (Aug. 1978). The total combined employer/employee payroll tax rate in-
creased from 12.10% in 1978 to 12.26% in 1979, 13.30% in 1981, and 13.40% in 1982.
1987 OASDI Trustees' Rep., supra note i1, at 1; 1987 HI Trustees' Rep., supra note 6, at
Table 1.
51. Robbins, Social Security: At What Price? 6-7 (1986) (on file with author). The
total combined employer/employee payroll tax rate increased from 14.0% in 1984 to
14.10% in 1985, 14.3% in 1986, 15.02% in 1988, and is scheduled to increase to 15.3%
in 1990. 1987 OASDI Trustees' Rep., supra note 11, at Table 1; 1987 HI T"rustees' Rep.,
supra note 6, at Table 1.
Yale Law & Policy Review
more recent study, Robbins and Robbins estimated that the payroll
tax rate increases in 1988 and 1990 would eliminate 500,000 jobs
per year. 52
In a society deeply concerned about employment opportunities,
the growing payroll tax burden on employment is already intolera-
ble. Yet without fundamental reform of Medicare, the future holds
further major payroll tax increases, unless the program's benefits
are cut sharply.
Yet current Medicare benefits already are inadequate to protect
the elderly from financially ruinous medical expenses. For basic
hospital coverage, the Medicare Part A deductible and co-insurance
fees can add up to almost $21,000 for a single hospital stay, 53 ex-
cluding the costs of the 20% Part B co-insurance fee for physician
services, inpatient drugs, special tests, therapy, and other treatment
services. Medicare coverage also runs out altogether after a certain
number of hospital days. Moreover, the program provides no sig-
nificant coverage for long-term, intermediate, or custodial care in
nursing homes or other settings. Yet long-term nursing home ex-
penses, which averaged almost $18,000 per year for basic care in
1985, can rapidly deplete the life savings of most elderly. 54 Medi-
care also does not pay for doctors' charges above maximum set fees,
leaving the elderly to pick up the difference when doctors charge
more, as many do. Also, as noted above, the program does not pro-
vide coverage for dental care, hearing aids, eyeglasses, outpatient
prescription drugs, walking aids, and similar items.
As a result of these many gaps in the program's benefit structure,
Medicare currently pays for only about 45% of the medical ex-
penses of retirees. 55 Indeed, the elderly pay as much or more of
52. Robbins & Robbins, The Effects of 1988 and 1990 Social Security Tax Increases
(forthcoming in IRET Econ. Rep.). The total combined employer/employee payroll tax
rate increased from 14.3% in 1987 to 15.02% in 1988, and is scheduled to increase to
15.3% in 1990. 1987 OASDI Trustees' Rep., supra note 11, at Table 1; 1987 HI Trust-
ees' Rep., supra note 6, at Table 1.
53. Calculated as follows: the Part A deductible of $540, the $135 per day co-insur-
ance fee for the 61st to 90th days of hospitalization, and the $270 co-insurance fee for
each lifetime reserve day.
54. The average per diem rate for intermediate nursing home care in 1985 was
$48.09 per day, amounting to $17,552.85 per year. Strahan, Nursing Home Character-
istics, Preliminary Data from the 1985 National Nursing Home Survey, Nat'l Center for
Health Statistics, No. 131, 7 (1987).
55. Waldo & Lazenby, Demographic Characteristics and Health Care Use and Ex-
penditures by the Aged in the U.S.: 1977-1984, Health Care Financing Rev., Table 13
(Fall 1984). Statement of Nancy M. Gordon, Assistant Director of Human Resources
and Community Development, CBO, before the House Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment, Comm. on Energy and Commerce 13 (March 26, 1986) (on file with
author).
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their income for medical expenses as they did before Medicare was
adopted. 56 Moreover, from the perspective of the elderly, the pri-
orities of the Medicare benefit structure are inverted. The chief
concern of the elderly is coverage for necessary but financially over-
whelming "catastrophic expenses," such as those arising fi'om long
hospital and nursing home stays. But Medicare does not consist-
ently provide such catastrophic coverage.5 7 The program's cover-
age is instead heavily skewed toward more routine and less
threatening costs that nevertheless add up to a heavy financial bur-
den on the federal government.
In an attempt to control spiraling Medicare costs and reduce
waste and inefficiency, the government adopted the Prospective Pay-
ment System (PPS) in 1983 for payment of hospital services under
Medicare. 58 Under PPS, the government has classified illnesses re-
quiring hospital treatment into almost 500 categories, and set the
amount it will pay under Medicare in each locality for treatment of
illness in each category. The set fees are based on an average of
local hospital charges for treating each illness. If the hospital can
treat the patient for less, it can keep the difference. If the treatment
costs more, however, the hospital cannot collect the extra charges
from the patient and must absorb the loss.
The idea was to give hospitals new incentives to reduce costs and
improve efficiency. But actually, the PPS seems to create powerful
incentives for hospitals to take short cuts and to shortchange medi-
cal consumers in quality of care. The hospital can maximize income
by processing patients as quickly and cheaply as possible. Even if
patients want to pay more for less hurried service and more per-
sonal attention, they are prohibited from doing so. Under PPS, the
hospital cannot accept extra payments from the patient for services
covered by Medicare. Indeed, once the patient enters the hospital
under PPS, the hospital automatically receives a flat fee from the
government, and thereafter faces the same economic incentives in
treating the patient as it would if it were providing charity. Any ex-
penses the hospital incurs for treatment in effect come out of its own
pocket. Consequently, services provided during each hospital stay
tend to be minimized, and hospitals may discharge patients sooner
56. See, e.g., Harvard Medicare Project, Div. of Health Pol'y Res. and Educ., Center
for Health Pol'y and Mgmt., Medicare: Coming of Age 1 (1986). Robbins & Hurwitz,
supra note 17, at 5.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
58. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-2 1, tit. VI, §§ 601-607, 97
Stat. 65, 149-73 (1983). See also Robbins & Hurwitz, supra note 17, at 3-4.
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than objective medical judgment would suggest. Patients who are
slow to respond to treatment may find themselves icily classified as
hopeless in a somewhat peremptory fashion. Media reports and
Con1gressional hearings have in fact already begun to echo com-
plaints of early hospital exits and other forms of inadequate treat-
ment attributable to the new payment system. 59
For those hospitals whose legitimate, unavoidable costs are above
the payments set by the government, the system effectively operates
is price controls. Indeed, the whole system is headed in this direc-
tion; the government has started to adopt freezes on the set fees
while the fees and illness categories already have become outdated
and ill-suited to varying local conditions. Such price controls natu-
rally tend to reduce the quality and supply of care provided under
Medicare.
As a result of this regulation, hospital bureaucracies, peer review
groups, and government auditors are effectively imposing more de-
tailed, centralized restrictions on the medical treatments doctors
can choose to provide, and engaging in more bureaucratic second-
guessing of the choices doctors are allowed to make. Hospital bu-
reaucracies are now much less willing to allow doctors to freely pur-
sue their medical judgment because of concern over whether
reimbursement can be collected under PPS. Doctors in the U.S.
have traditionally had the freedom and authority to choose a course
of medical treatment based on their own best judgment and the
preferences of the patient. Such freedom has created a highly flexi-
ble, innovative, and decentralized system of medical care. These
features have in fact been central to the American medical system
and may be a key factor in its generally high quality of care. The
trend towards more centralized restrictions and bureaucratic sec-
ond-guessing is undermining those features, again resulting in a re-
duced quality of care for the elderly under Medicare.
Overall, therefore, Medicare faces overwhelming short- and long-
term financing problems that must be addressed. Doing so within
the confines of the present system would require either dramatic
payroll tax increases or draconian benefit reductions. Yet, payroll
59. See, e.g., The Effects of PPS on Quality of Care for Medicare Patients: Hearings
Before the Special Comm. on Aging, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986); Quality of Care
tinder Medicare's Prospective Payment System: Hearings Before the Special Senate
Comm. on Aging, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 313-37 (1985); Impact of Medicare's Prospec-
tive Payment System on the Quality of Care Received by Medicare Beneficiaries. Staff of
the Special Comm. on Aging, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1985). See also Robbins & Hurwitz,
sapra note 17, at 3-4.
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taxes are already so high as to reduce job opportunities, and the
program's benefits are already inadequate to protect the elderly
from high medical costs. New regulatory restrictions and payment
systems that were adopted to reduce costs now also threaten the
quality of care for the elderly. Consequently, Medicare is badly in
need of reform.
III. Pending Catastrophic Coverage Legislation
Legislation now pending before Congress seeks to provide new
,catastrophic coverage under Medicare. Both the House and Senate
bills6't 1 would provide for an unlimited number of days of hospital
coverage under Medicare and the elimination of the current co-in-
surance fees applying after 60 days. The House bill would cap the
beneficiary's liability under the Part B co-insurance fee to $1,043
per year and charge only one Part A hospital deductible per year
(currently $540), for a total $1,583 cap on Medicare deductible and
co-insurance fees in the first year. The Part B annual cap would be
indexed to increase with general inflation, while the Part A deducti-
ble would continue to be indexed to increase with hospital costs.
The Senate bill would cap both the part A deductible and Part B co-
insurance fees at $1,850 per year, indexed to increase with rising
health costs.
Both the House and Senate bills would increase coverage for care
in a skilled nursing facility to 150 days per year from the current 100
days, and eliminate the current co-insurance fees that apply after 20
days. The House bill would apply a co-insurance fee equal to 20%
of average daily approved costs for the first seven days of such care
each year. This fee would be $23.50 in 1988, compared with a daily
co-insurance fee under the current law of $67.50 after 20 days of
nursing facility care. 6' The Senate bill would apply a co-insurance
fee for the first 10 days of such care each year, equal to 15% of
average daily approved charges ($18.00 in 198862). In the Senate
but not in the House, these co-insurance fees would be subject to
the annual cap of $1,850.
Both the House and Senate bills would also provide coverage for
prescription drugs, subject to a deductible of $500 per year in the
60. H.R. 2470, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. Rep. No. 105, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987); S. 1127, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. Rep. No. 126, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987). The original Senate bill has now been superseded by H.R. 2470, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (as amended by the Senate).
61. CBO, A Comparison of House and Senate Catastrophic Bills 8 (1987).
62. Id.
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House bill and $600 per year in the Senate bill (both indexed to
increase with drug costs) and a co-insurance fee of 20% of drug
expenses after the deductibles. These deductible and co-insurance
fees would not be subject to the annual caps on costs to the benefici-
ary under either bill. The two bills include minor additional benefits
as well, which are beyond the scope of this discussion.
Such benefits would be financed in part by a huge income tax in-
crease exclusively on the elderly. Under the House bill, 58 supple-
mental tax brackets would be added to the income tax tables for the
elderly, starting at an adjusted gross income of $6,000 per year. In
1989, the tax would climb to a maximum of $730 per year for single
elderly taxpayers with a $14,900 income and to $1,460 per year for
an elderly couple with a $29,800 income; this would be in addition
to regular income tax payments. 63 As a result of this tax increase,
the 15% marginal tax rate would be increased for the elderly to
22% until the tax cap was reached. 64
Under the House legislation, the new taxes would automatically
increase each year to meet the costs of the new Medicare expendi-
tures. By 1992, the maximum supplemental tax would be $993 for a
single elderly person and $1,986 for an elderly couple. 65 The
Treasury Department estimates that 13 years later the maximum an-
nual supplemental tax would be $3,000-$4,000 for a single elderly
person and $6,000-$8,000 for an elderly couple, in constant 1988 dol-
lars.6 6 Along with these yearly tax increases, effective marginal tax
rates on the elderly would increase each year as well. The Treasury
estimates that by 1992 the 15% marginal tax rate would be in-
creased to 25% for the elderly, up to the amount of the supplemen-
tal tax cap.6 7
The total income tax increase on the elderly would amount to $5
billion per year to start and about $36 billion over the first five full
years (1989-93).68 The Treasury estimates that 12 years later, the
63. Id. at 5.
64. Letter from Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Roger Mentz to Rep. Dan Ros-
tenkowski, Chairman of the Comm. on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives
2 (June 23, 1987) [hereinafter Mentz letter].
65. CBO, A Comparison of House and Senate Catastrophic Bills, supra note 59, at
Table 3.
66. 133 Cong. Rec. E2262 (daily ed. June 4, 1987) (Memorandum from Sonia Conly,
Off. of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury to Rep. Philip M. Crane (May 21,
1987)).
67. Mentz letter, supra note 62, at 2.
68. Estimated from CBO, A Comparison of House and Senate Catastrophic Bills,
supra note 59, at Table 4.
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total added income tax burden on the elderly would amount to $20
billion per year in constant 1989 dollars." '9
In addition, a new flat monthly premium for each beneficiary
would be added to the monthly Part B premium to finance part of
the new benefits, again automatically increasing to pay benefit costs
over the years. By 1992, this extra premium is projected to be $5.70
per month. 70 The regular Part B premium already increased $6.90
per month last year alone, 71 and is projected to increase to $29.70
per month by 1992.72 This rise would result in a total flat monthly
premium by 1992 of $35.40, or $424.80 per year for each benefici-
ary, in addition to the income tax increases noted above. The total
income tax and Medicare premium increases for an elderly couple
by 1992 could total $2,835.60.
The Senate bill would impose a similar tax increase on the elderly,
based on an income tax surcharge of about 8.7% for single persons
and 17.4% for married couples. An income tax surcharge is a flat
increase in income tax liability by the percentage of the surcharge.
A new flat premium of $4 per month per beneficiary also would be
added to the current Part B premium in 1988. Both the income tax
surcharge and new monthly premium again would be increased au-
tomatically each year to meet program costs.
The two bills are currently in conference, having passed their re-
spective houses. Even if a version of this legislation is enacted, ma-
jor gaps in the Medicare benefit structure will remain. Neither
proposal offers new coverage for long-term care in nursing homes
or for doctors' charges above the Medicare-set fees. Dental care,
eyeglasses, hearing aids, and similar items still would remain
uncovered.
In fact, the legislation merely expands Medicare to provide cover-
age that a great majority of the elderly already have through other
sources. The major focus of the bills is reduction of Medicare's cur-
rent deductible and co-insurance fees and coverage for additional
days of hospitalization. But as noted, this is precisely the coverage
that about three-fourths of the elderly already have through private
69. Mentz letter, supra note 62, at 2.
70. CBO, A Comparison of House and Senate Catastrophic Bills, supra note 59, al
Table 3.
71. 52 Fed. Reg. 37616-17 (1987).
72. CBO, A Comparison of House and Senate Catastrophic Bills, supra note 59, at
Table 3.
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insurance and/or HMOs, and another 10% have through
Medicaid. 73
Outpatient prescription drugs are the one major area to which the
new legislation would extend coverage not already provided to most
of the elderly. But such drug expenses usually do not represent the
kind of catastrophic costs that can overwhelm a family's resources.
The new drug coverage would merely provide a couple of hundred
dollars per year in additional income redistribution to some Medi-
care recipients who happen to utilize drugs more heavily during a
year. Insurance coverage for drug expenses has b.een available in
the private sector for some time, but the elderly have chosen not to
purchase it on as widespread a basis as they have coverage in other
areas.74 This suggests that the elderly do not find such coverage as
worthwhile as they do other types of coverage. Indeed, insurance
for drugs may be undesirable since it could induce substantial and
unnecessary overutilization of drugs, which are a relatively easy and
painless form of medical care, but not always most appropriate.
The proposed legislation consequently imposes a harsh, discrimi-
natory tax burden on the elderly for the wrong benefits and fails to
provide benefits in the crucial areas where the elderly now have no
coverage. The new tax burden would reverse tax reform for the eld-
erly. While everyone else would enjoy a simplified tax system with
just two tax brackets and relatively low marginal tax rates, the eld-
erly would face a different system with up to 58 brackets and higher
marginal rates. The legislation also does not address the long-term
financial problems of the program, and indeed would make those
problems worse if the new taxes fail to keep up with program costs.
Nor does the legislation address the other major problems of Medi-
care discussed above. This legislation, therefore, fails fundamen-
tally to reform Medicare as is necessary to address its deep
problems.
IV A Private Sector Option
A more comprehensive approach to the problems of Medicare is
now pending before Congress in legislation that would create a pri-
vate sector option. 75 Spearheaded by Representative French
Slaughter (R-Va), the legislation has 40 co-sponsors, including
Democrats and Republicans.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
74. Health Insurance Ass'n of America.
75. H.R. 955, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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The bill would allow workers and their employers to contribute to
individual Health Care Savings Accounts (HCSAs) for each worker,
up to the amount of employee/employer Medicare payroll taxes.
Contributors would receive an income tax credit equal to 60% of
the amounts paid into the accounts. The contributions and invest-
ment returns would accumulate tax-free until retirement. Workers
could not withdraw 60% of the contributions and returns before re-
,tirement, since they already would have received income tax credits
-for those amounts. They could withdraw the remaining 40%, how-
(ever, subject to a penalty, as with a regular IRA.
To the extent each worker chose to utilize this option over his or
her working years, an added annual deductible would be applied
before the payment of any Medicare benefits to that worker in re-
tirement. The added deductible would be calculated under a
formula roughly determining the amount of health insurance cover-
age the worker would be able to buy each year with accumulated
HCSA funds, given his or her record of past contributions. This
calculation would assume a modest investment return earned on
such contributions, equal to an average of the returns earned on
federal securities (historically around 1-1.5% in real terms). Only
60% of contributions would be counted in determining the deducti-
ble, corresponding to the percentage of the tax credit the worker
would receive for contributions to the HCSA. After retirement, the
worker would use HCSA funds to purchase insurance covering med-
ical expenses below the added deductible, or to pay such expenses
directly.
Workers could choose to exercise the HCSA option in some years
-and not in others and in differing degrees each year, and their ulti-
mate added deductible would be adjusted accordingly under the
formula. The more workers contributed over their careers and the
earlier they contributed, the higher their added Medicare deduct-
ibles would be because they would accumulate more in their ac-
counts. Workers already in the workforce when the HCSA option
was enacted would simply be assumed not to have exercised the op-
tion during prior working years. Consequently, they would bear an
added Medicare deductible only to the extent they exercised the
HCSA option during their remaining working years.
Workers exercising the HCSA option to the maximum over their
entire career would bear an added Medicare deductible of several
thousand dollars per year in retirement, possibly $5,000 to $10,000
or more. But they would likely have far more than enough money in
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their HCSAs to finance insurance covering medical expenses below
the deductible, given the deliberate design of the added deductible
formula and the investment returns workers could earn on their
HCSA funds over the years. 76 Workers who exercised the HCSA
option to a lesser degree during their working years would have
proportionally lower deductibles, again with more than enough in
their HCSAs to finance coverage for expenses below the deductible.
Workers who exercised the HCSA option over their careers to a
minimum degree would also receive catastrophic coverage under
Medicare for acute care by doctors and hospitals related to a specific
illness. For these workers, Medicare would pay for unlimited days
of hospital care after the added deductible was satisfied, and all co-
insurance fees for hospital days covered by Medicare would be elim-
mated. The 20% co-insurance charge for Medicare Part B would be
subject to an annual cap of $1,000 per worker. HCSA funds also
could be used to finance long-term care in nursing homes, or to pay
for insurance to cover such expenses.
Workers in retirement also could make certain cash withdrawals
from their HCSAs. If during the year a retiree spent less than a
specified proportion of HCSA funds on medical expenses or insur-
ance, at the end of the year the retiree could withdraw the difference
and use it without restriction. If a worker earned a return on his or
her HCSA investments over his or her career higher than .the mod-
est target return assumed in the added deductible formula, the
worker could also withdraw the excess accumulated funds in cash at
any point during retirement. The worker could always withdraw up
to 40% of HCSA contributions and returns in retirement without
penalty as with a regular IRA. 77 Any cash withdrawal from an HCSA
76. Even if a worker earned on his or her HCSA funds just the modest return that
government securities do, since that is the return assumed in the added deductible
formula and only 60% of contributions are counted in computing the deductible, work-
ers would have two-thirds more than is necessary to finance insurance for the deducti-
ble. At the higher market returns available on corporate bonds, mutual fms, blue chip
stocks, and other investments, workers would have several times the amount necessary
to finance the added deductible. For a discussion of the market returns earned by vari-
ous investment vehicles, see P. Ferrara, Social Security Rates of Returns for Today's
Young Workers 14-16 (1986).
77. For example, assume that a worker retired with $500,000 in his HCSA account,
but with the modest return earned on federal securities, 60% of his contributions each
year would equal $200,000. The worker would be able to withdraw $300,000 without
restriction, subject to income taxation. The $200,000 should be sufficient to cover the
added deductible expenses, given the design of the added deductible formula; allowing
the worker to withdraw the excess would make the HCSA option even more attractive,
increasing the degree to which workers would exercise it. Moreover, if we assume that
$200,000 would support an annuity of $10,000 per year for the life of the retired
worker, that $10,000 would be the annual medical expense target. If the worker spent
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would be included in taxable income, however. But any withdrawal
for medical expenses or health insurance would be free from tax.
Workers and employers who contributed to HCSAs would con-
tinue to pay their Medicare payroll taxes in full. But the income tax
credits for HCSA contributions are designed to offset these taxes,
and in effect give workers their tax money back to the extent they
choose to rely on their private HCSA funds rather than on Medi-
care. Since the credits are taken against income taxes rather than
payroll taxes, the payroll tax revenues that finance Medicare are not
reduced. Such revenues would continue to be fully and exclusively
available to pay benefits to today's elderly.
V Advantages of the Private Option
The HCSA option could sharply reduce and potentially eliminate
altogether the long-term financing problems of Medicare, without
cutting benefits for the elderly or increasing payroll taxes on work-
ers. This is possible because, while Medicare payroll taxes still
would be levied at current rates, the added deductibles resulting
from the exercise of the HCSA option would sharply reduce the
program's expenditures. With revenues maintained and expendi-
tures reduced, the long-term Medicare financing gap would shrink.
The extent to which the private option ultimately would reduce
the Medicare financing gap depends on the degree to which workers
would contribute to the HCSAs. Workers contributing the maxi-
mum throughout their careers would be privately financing the
great majority, possibly 80% or more, of retirement medical ex-
penses otherwise chargeable to Medicare, greatly reducing the cost
burden on the program. Potentially, total Medicare spending could
be reduced by as much as 80% on net as a result of workers exercis-
ing the private option. This would eliminate the long-term financ-
ing problems of Medicare by the time today's young workers retire,
even under the pessimistic projections.78 Consequently, the need to
raise the Medicare payroll tax 130-400% or, alternatively, to reduce
benefits 50% or more would be avoided. Indeed, under intermedi-
ate projections, Medicare spending potentially could be reduced to
only $4,000 on insurance and medical expenses during the year, he could withdraw
$6,000 at the end of the year.
78. As noted, under intermediate assumptions, the current lax rates would raise suf
ficient revenues by the time today's young workers retire to pay 43% of promised bene-
fits. See supra note 3 1. If expenditures were reduced by 80%, payroll taxes would need
to finance only 20% of currently projected expenditures.
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such a degree that the program's current total payroll tax rate of
2.9% could be cut in half.79
The net savings to Medicare from the increased deductibles
would begin slowly and grow over the years as more workers retired
having contributed to HCSAs for more years and therefore accumu-
lated greater added deductibles. The early cost savings would delay
the date that the Medicare program runs short of funds, but are un-
likely to accumulate quickly enough to avoid some interim years
during which the program would be unable to pay promised bene-
fits. During these years, interfund borrowing from the Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds of the So-
cial Security system still could prevent benefit cuts or tax increases,
just as these Social Security trust funds borrowed from Medicare
when they were in trouble in the 1980s. As it happens, the Social
Security trust funds are likely to accumulate substantial reserves
from 1990 to 2020 and, under intermediate assumptions, could eas-
ily cover the remaining Medicare shortfalls, without threat to Social
Security benefits, until the HCSA option completely eliminated the
gap.80 Under pessimistic assumptions, the Social Security trust
funds are unlikely to be able to cover interim Medicare shortfalls
completely.8 ' Absent such interfund borrowing, or to the extent
such available borrowing is inadequate, some combination of bene-
fit cuts or tax increases would be required during these interim
years, but on a vastly lower scale than otherwise would be required.
To the extent workers did not exercise the HCSA option suffi-
ciently, some permanent benefit reductions or tax increases would
be necessary to completely close the financing gap.
The HCSA option also would provide new incentives for consum-
ers to counter rapidly rising health costs. Those exercising the pri-
vate option would purchase medical care and coverage with funds
from their own private accounts. Consumers who avoided unneces-
sary or overly expensive charges could retain greater reserves in
their accounts to pay for future expenses or to leave to their chil-
79. Under the pessimistic assumptions, by the time today's young workers retired,
payroll tax revenues would be sufficient to finance only 21 % of promised benefits. See
supra note 35.
80. Under intermediate assumptions, the Social Security trust funds could finance
the entire present Medicare shortfall from 1990 to 2020 without any threat to Social
Security benefits, but the funds would need to be paid back in later years to continue
meeting benefit obligations over ensuing decades. Calculated from 1987 OADSI Trust-
ees' Rep., supra note II, at Table E3; 1987 HI Trustees' Rep., supra note 6, at Table 11.
See also Ballantyne, Long-Range Estimates of Social Security Trust Fund Operations in
Dollars, Social Security Admin. Actuarial Note 130 (Apr. 1987).
81. Calculated from the sources cited in supra note 80.
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dren. They also could make cash withdrawals to supplement their
retirement income. Consumers, therefore, would be likely to devote
more effort to seeking out the least costly service providers. And
they would be likely to seek care and coverage through institutions
with greater efficiencies, such as HMOs or insurers with networks of
assigned doctors who follow efficient and low-cost practices, or in-
surers who otherwise are able to pressure service providers into
keeping costs down. Consumers also would be more likely to favor
insurance covering only large unexpected costs, keeping control
over their own funds and costs for more routine expenses. Addi-
tionally, consumers would have greater interest in avoiding unnec-
essary medical care or services that they felt were not worth the cost.
Moreover, the HCSA option would provide consumers an incentive
for devoting greater attention to preventive measures that could
save medical costs over the long run.
Increased competition would complement these consumer incen-
tives, since Medicare would no longer have a monopoly on provid-
ing most medical coverage for the elderly. Private insurers and
medical care providers would be able to compete to provide the cov-
erage and services that Medicare now preempts. These private com-
petitors could be expected to monitor health care providers closely
and root out wasteful, unnecessary expenditures and fraud in order
to keep their own costs down. They are likely to improve and ex-
pand institutional arrangements that lower costs, such as HMOs or
networks of assigned doctors. Finally, the increased competition
and consumer cost sensitivity also should increase pressure for de-
velopment of lower-cost medical technologies.
Consequently, the HCSA option would operate as a means of
bringing natural market incentives back into medicine, not in a
harsh way, threatening deprivation, but in a positive way, by provid-
ing enhanced benefits and rewards in response to market incentives.
Such market incentives might be able to halt the trend toward ever
higher health costs, without the burdensome cost control regula-
tions and rationing that ultimately would reduce the quality of care
for the elderly.812
Through the HCSAs, workers would receive catastrophic cover-
age for acute care under Medicare only after they had taken respon-
82. Through the HCSAs, consumers would face market incentives more nearly re-
flecting the true economic costs of their health care. This would not create a "disincen-
tive" to seek health care, or quality care. but rather it would allow consumers to evalhate
the degree and quality of health care they desire based on their own preferences and the
true costs. Consumers would be able to make the judgment. based on their own prefer-
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sibilitv for substantial front-end costs commensurate with their
abiliiy to meet such costs; this would sharply reduce the total bur-
den on Medicare. The inverted priorities of the current Medicare
benefits structure would be reversed. The private sector would be
responsible for the bulk of routine, less threatening, front-end costs,
and the government would play a back-up role by covering cata-
strophic health care expenses. Medicare would not be simply ex-
panded to take over the catastrophic coverage now provided
through the private sector, as is proposed in the pending cata-
strophic illness legislation. Moreover, even after financing the costs
of the added deductibles, HCSAs, contributed to regularly over a
worker's career, would likely still contain sufficient funds to cover
most long-term care, if not directly, at least through private insur-
ance mechanisms."" Thus the HCSAs would foster the development
of additional private savings to finance the high costs of long-term
care. These private savings are the only real potential source of new
funds to meet such costs.
The HCSA option would be highly attractive and beneficial to
workers as individuals. Workers would likely accumulate through
the HCSAs substantially more than is necessary to handle the in-
creased deductibles, giving them large net gains . 4 Workers would
have much greater control and freedom of choice regarding their
retirement medical coverage and medical care. With the opportu-
nity for cash withdrawals from the accounts during retirement,
workers could substantially improve their retirement income and
would have a new means of coverage for catastrophic and long-term
nursing home care.
If, despite all these benefits, a worker did not want to exercise the
HCSA option and preferred to continue to rely entirely on Medi-
care, he or she would be perfectly free to do so. Indeed, this worker
ences, as to the value of additional health care or higher quality care versus alternative
goods and services they could purchase with unspent HCSA funds.
Doctors and health care providers would, of course, have to accommodate consumer
demands for cost efficiency in the market revived by HCSAs. But doctors would be able
to try out and determine on a decentralized basis the best means and systems for meet-
ing those economic realities, now better reflected in the market. Doctors would face the
same market demands and enjoy the same freedom to respond as other professionals.
[his decentralized, flexible market process would determine what balances between
competing considerations are preferred by consumers, with different systems reflecting
diferenm balances likely to be available to serve varying consumer preferences. This
process would maximize the positive features of our decentralized doctor/patient rela-
tionships to the extent they are valued by consumers, within a cost-economizing
framework.
83. See .upra note 73.
84. Id.
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would receive the advantage of the improved financial outlook for
Medicare, and thus more secure benefits. Similarly, the private ac-
count option would not result in any benefit cuts for the elderly.
Rather, the elderly also would benefit from the improved financial
strength of Medicare. At the same time, the reduction in Medicare
spending resulting from exercise of the private option would reduce
federal spending by as much as $60-65 billion per year in today's
terms.
The HCSA legislation addresses every one of the current major
issues in health care for the elderly-catastrophic care, long-term
care, the Medicare financing crisis, and new incentives for control-
ling ever-spiraling health care costs. Moreover, the legislation does
so in a positive manner that does not threaten the elderly or add to
the payroll tax problem already burdening workers.
VI. Concerns Over the Private Option
While the HCSA option could stabilize the finances of Medicare
without increasing payroll taxes, it also could entail a significant cost
in terms of lost income tax revenue due to the tax credits given for
contributions to the accounts. This revenue loss would be relatively
small at first, however, since fewer workers would be expected to
exercise a new and unfamiliar option right away. If the option be-
came effective at the start of FY 1988, and 10% of the workforce
exercised it maximally in that very first year, the revenue loss would
be $3.6 billion.85 When regular IRAs reached full bloom, about
one-fifth of the workforce contributed to them each year; eventually
about one-third held IRAs to which they contributed at some
point.8 6 If 20% of the workforce exercised an HCSA option effec-
tive in FY 1988, the revenue loss in that year would be $7.2 billion.
As discussed further below, more workers could be expected to
exercise the option over time, leading to a greater loss of income tax
revenue. But at the same time, increased deductibles from exercise
of the private option would begin to reduce Medicare spending and
offset some of the revenue loss. Even workers close to retirement
would have a strong incentive to exercise the option because their
85. Total Medicare payroll tax revenues under intermediate assumptions are pro-
jected to total $60.5 billion in FY 1988. 1987 HI Trustees Rep., supra note 6, at Table 5.
If 10% of workers exercised the option maximally in that year, $6 billion would be con-
tributed to HCSAs. A 60% income tax credit for such contributions would total $3.6
billion in lost revenue.
86. Ferrara, Deductible IRAs are Best for Workers, Cato Pol'y Analysis No. 3, 5
(1986).
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added deductibles would be commensurately smaller, reflecting
contributions made to the HCSAs during the few years before re-
tirement. Spending reductions from the added deductibles for
these workers would begin to -accrue relatively rapidly. While the
spending reductions would be relatively small at first, over time the
reductions would grow substantially and eventually would be at
least as great as the revenue loss from the tax credits.8 7
Moreover, even during the temporary period of net revenue loss,
increased savings would be accumulating in the HCSAs and would
at least equal the amount of revenue loss.8 8 So even if the deficit
simply increased by the full amount of the revenue loss and the gov-
ernment just increased borrowing by that amount, there would be
no net increase in the government borrowing drain on private sav-
ings, which is the real concern about the deficit. Increased savings
in the HCSAs would offset the increased borrowing. Indeed, even if
the government simply borrowed to cover the net revenue loss for
the entire transition period, such borrowing would involve the ex-
plicit recognition of the implicit government debt that already exists
in the unfunded liabilities of Medicare. To the extent the temporary
net revenue loss was financed by means other than borrowing, such
as reductions in government spending, sales of underutilized gov-
ernment assets, or new revenues, total savings would be increased,
enhancing economic growth and increasing national wealth. The in-
crease in savings would result in increased revenues from taxes on
the investment returns to such new capital, through the corporate
income tax in particular. This increased revenue would combine
with the Medicare spending reductions resulting from the HCSA
option to offset the revenue loss more quickly.
The significance of the revenue loss from the HCSA option ulti-
mately must be weighed against the benefits of the reform. The pri-
vate option would create a new system with more comprehensive
87. On the simplest level, if taxes and spending under a Medicare-type system were
equal, and workers withdrew the taxes to provide for their future benefits through the
private sector, spending in retirement would fall to offset the revenue loss as the benefits
would be provided through private savings and insurance rather than through Medicare.
Under the proposed HCSA option, with future Medicare spending reduced by an in-
creased amount due to the presumed private investment returns on HCSA contribu-
tions, spending might be reduced by more than the revenue loss over the long term.
88. Increased savings would at least equal the revenue loss because the 60% tax
credit is given for contributions to HCSA savings, so on its face the option should result
in a revenue loss equal to only 60% of the savings increase. Potentially some existing
savings would be shifted into HCSAs, and the resulting savings increase would be com-
mensurately reduced. But few workers have fluid savings to shift into an HCSA. For
further discussion of this issue in the context of IRAs, see Ferrara. Deductible IRAs,
supra note 83, at 6-7.
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,coverage and carefully structured, rational roles for the private and
public sectors and replace a current, jerry-built system overwhelmed
with intractable difficulties. The need for dramatic increases in pay-
,roll taxes and general revenue contributions to the current pro-
gram, or for dramatic reductions in health coverage for the elderly,
would be avoided. New incentives would be created to address the
root problem in health care policy: rapidly rising medical costs.
Considering the benefits of the private option and the enormity of
the problems addressed, the reform seems to be well worth the
costs.
Some may question whether the private option would be exer-
cised by only a small proportion of workers, particularly those who
earn higher incomes and have more resources to contribute to the
HCSAs. While millions of workers contributed to regular IRAs, as
noted, the total contributing still amounted to significantly less than
half the workforce. But a much larger proportion of the workforce
ultimately should contribute to HCSAs. As discussed, the private
option would be highly attractive to workers, offering large net gains
as well as substantial new resources for retirement and new cata-
strophic care coverage under Medicare. Moreover, exercising the
private option would involve a much smaller burden on workers
than contributing to IRAs. Workers would receive a 60% tax credit
for contributions to HCSAs, not the simple deduction received with
IRAs. A worker contributing $1,000 to an HCSA, for example,
would reduce his or her income taxes by $600, while a worker in the
15% income tax bracket contributing $1,000 to an IRA would re-
duce his or her income taxes by only $150. Moreover, workers
could withdraw the remaining 40% if needed, subject only to a 10%
penalty. This penalty, amounting to 4% of total contributions, is
the only net out-of-pocket cost that is necessary to exercise the pri-
vate option. Even if they regularly withdrew 40% of contributions
each year, workers would still have more than enough money to
cover the added deductibles in retirement, so long as their HCSA
investments earned more than the modest target investment return
assumed in the added deductible formula, which is likely. Such
withdrawals during working years, however, would leave workers
with less funds in their HCSAs to meet nursing home expenses and
other costs.
The HCSA option is also designed so that employers play a major
role. Employers can make some or all of their workers' contribu-
tions and receive the 60% income tax credit accordingly. With this
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high tax credit and the benefits of the private option to workers,
employers should find contributing to HCSAs a highly attractive
ineans of compensating their workers. Accordingly, worker partici-
pation in the private option through employer-sponsored programs
may be widespread.
Overall, therefore, participation in the private HCSA option
would be practical and feasible for virtually all regularly employed
workers. Given the attractiveness of the private option for workers,
there is reason to expect that the great majority ultimately will exer-
cise the option.
Low-income individuals who work only intermittently will surely
not have sufficient funds to contribute to HCSAs. But those who do
not work do not contribute to or become eligible for Medicare
either. A contributory system in either the public or private sectors
will not help intermittent workers who do not earn enough to con-
tribute. For such individuals, a pure income redistribution program
such as Medicaid is needed. Medicaid currently provides compre-
hensive coverage to those elderly who are sufficiently poor to qual-
ifty. But in many states, an elderly person can be very poor and still
not be poor enough to qualify for Medicaid.
As part of reform providing for an HCSA option, Medicaid should
be reevaluated and updated to ensure that it can perform essential,
complementary functions for the new system. Medicaid should
cover those who are unable to work regularly during pre-retirement
years and who fail to develop adequate retirement health coverage
through HCSAs, Medicare, or other means. Modifications to Medi-
caid may also be necessary to ensure that medical costs do not have
to deplete the essential assets of an elderly couple or individual,
such as the family home or a basic cushion of savings, before Medi-
caid eligibility becomes effective. The issue of asset depletion is
particularly acute for elderly couples, for whom one spouse's illness
depletes the family's resources before Medicaid steps in, leaving the
remaining spouse without adequate support. Medicaid would also
serve as a back-up to those who exercised the HCSA option, ensur-
ing access to essential medical care if they experienced some ex-
treme misfortune with their funds. Medicaid would need to be
reevaluated and updated as well to ensure that it could perform this
function.
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Conclusion
Under the proposed private option, a highly attractive, rationallk
designed system would be established, with workers and their em-
ployers saving during their working years for the more routinle med-
ical expenses in retirement, and the government providing back-up
catastrophic health care coverage. The government would also
cover those in need who were unable to develop the resources and
coverage to provide for themselves under the HCSA option. Both
private and public health care coverage would be more comprehen-
sive than current Medicare coverage for the elderly.
The Medicare system is now a basic, essential feature of American
life. But it is in such disarray that it seriously threatens the financial
and physical health of both old and young. The proposed Health
Care Savings Account would provide an opportunity for the elderly
and current workers to join together in support of fundamental
Medicare reform and address the current system's intractable
problems by providing an expanded role for the private sector in
meeting the health care needs of the elderly. The possible alterna-
tives-tax increases, benefit cuts, or perhaps even regulatory health
care rationing-all seem to pose serious problems that the HCSA
option could avoid.
